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The U.S. Congress is debating changes in
environmental and public health regulation.
Although bills on this subject previously
have been introduced, the passage ofHR 9
in the House ofRepresentatives and consid-
eration of similar legislation in the Senate
have given renewed visibility to issues of
risk assessment and priority setting that
have been discussed in Environmental
HealthPerspectives (14).
The focus of current legislation is on
regulatory programs intended to protect the
environment and the health and safety of
the public. Debate has centered on whether
regulations adopted to achieve these pur-
poses are too costly, whether they are too
inflexible, whether they reflect the correct
set ofpriorities, and whether they incorpo-
rate scientific findings in appropriate ways.
Neither the health of the public nor the
environment is receiving much attention in
this debate.
Environmental and health regulations
have been criticized as not always adopting
the most cost-effective methods to achieve
specific goals, as having costs that outweigh
the benefits, and as requiting resources that
could be used for other purposes (5,6).
Economists argue that market-based meth-
ods and economic incentives may be more
effective and less expensive than centralized
regulatoryapproaches (7-9).
Priority setting is a second area of con-
cern. Many have argued that the mix of
approaches adopted over the years to
address environmental and health issues no
longer reflects the most useful set ofpriori-
ties. Some problems receive too much
attention; others receive too little (10,11).
Some in the scientific community have
expressed the view that the scientific basis
for some regulatory decisions has been
insufficient or that current findings have
not been accurately reflected. The stated
goals of legislation are to improve priority
setting and the scientific basis ofregulation
and to ensure that benefits achieved are
worth the costs incurred (12).
The academic and research communi-
ties have supported improvements in risk
assessment and risk characterization. A
committee of the National Research
Council (NRC) of the National Academy
ofSciences (NAS) recendy issued an exten-
sive report recommending improvements
in assessment and characterization of risk
(13). The Carnegie Commission on
Science, Technology and Government has
recommended a stronger role for the
Office of Science and Technology Policy
in overseeing improvements (14). Many
participants in the policy debate have
advocated consideration of cost to inform
decision-making, while recognizing the
limitations ofcost-benefit analysis (15).
The federal government has taken
action on such recommendations. For
example, the Environmental Protection
Agency has embarked upon a review ofits
cancer risk assessment guidelines (16) and
is developing guidelines for assessing neu-
rotoxicity. Since the 1970s, presidents have
prescribed analyses to be conducted as part
ofthe regulatory process. Executive Order
12866 was adopted in September 1993
and requires analysis of major regulations
to ensure that benefits are in proportion to
costs, as well as assessment ofrisks (17).
The criticisms of current regulatory
approaches are important, and real change
is needed. Few would argue against the
need to streamline regulation and focus on
important problems. We need to assess
whether the proposals are likely to result in
improvements to the current situation.
True reform will reflect the underlying
purpose of the regulations (i.e., protection
ofthe health ofthe public and the environ-
ment).
The Proposals andTheir Four Major
Components
In the House of Representatives, the Job
Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of
1995, HR 9, was introduced as one of the
bills in the "Contract with America" pack-
age developed by the Republican leader-
ship. The portions most relevant to envi-
ronmental health were Title III, risk assess-
ment and cost-benefit analysis for new reg-
ulations; Title IV, establishment of federal
regulatory budget cost control; Title VI,
strengthening regulatory flexibility; Title
VII, regulatory impact analysis; and Title
IX, private property rights protection and
compensation. The bill was divided into
pieces that were referred to different com-
mittees for hearing and revision. Title III
was referred to the House Committees on
Science; Commerce; and Government
Reform and Oversight. The Title III provi-
sions were reported back as HR 1022, the
Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of
1995, which was passed by the House and
rolled back into a new version of HR 9 as
part D. HR 9 passed the House by a vote of
277-141 on 3 March 1995 (18).
The Senate has also developed legisla-
tion on risk assessment and cost-benefit
analysis. S 343, the Comprehensive
Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, introduced
by Senator Bob Dole (R-KA), was reported
from the Senate Judiciary Committee in
May (19). The Senate leadership attempted
to bring this bill to a vote in July, but ade-
quate votes to bring debate to a close were
lacking (20,21). Section 4 of S 343 is con-
sidered in this paper. Other sections ofthe
bill address administrative procedures and
regulatory impact analyses, among other
topics.
Although they differ in many ways, HR
9 and S 343 include four provisions in
major areas that will impact public health:
1) new or revisedproceduresfor analysis
include prescriptions for how to conduct
risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses
and how to characterize risks; 2) new criteria
formakingdecisionsspecify that the results of
the new approaches to risk assessment and
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characterization are to be incorporated into
regulatory proposals. Proposals are to pass a
cost-benefit test before they may be adopt-
ed; 3) newprocesses or rightsfor appeal or
review ofcurrent or new decisions or analyses
allow individuals to petition to reopen
existing environmental or health standards
based on new criteria and substantively
challenge in court elements of risk assess-
ments and risk characterizations required as
the basis for new agency actions; and 4) new
approaches to priority setting specify that
executive agencies are to perform compara-
tive risk analyses on subject areas under
theirjurisdiction.
NewMandates and Methods for
RiskAssessment and Economic
Analysis
Both HR 9 and S 343 include provisions
for risk assessment and economic analysis
for agency actions projected to have impacts
above a defined threshold. This threshold is
$25 million in HR 9 (22) and $50 million
in S 343 (23). In the House bill, require-
ments for risk assessment and risk charac-
terization apply to 10 federal agencies and 6
types ofactions, induding (24):
risk assessment documents or risk charac-
terization documents prepared by or on
behalf of a Federal agency in the imple-
mentation of a regulatory program
designed to protect human health, safety
or the environment and used as the basis
for ...
i) any proposed or final rule ...
ii) any proposed or final cleanup plan ...
iii) any proposed or final permit condi-
tion ...
iv) any report to Congress
v) any regulatory action to place a sub-
stance on any official list of carcinogens
or toxic or hazardous substances includ-
ing the Integrated Risk Information
System (IRIS) database
vi) any guidance ...
The Senate bill addresses "all risk
assessments and characterizations prepared
by, or ... adopted by any agency in con-
nection with health, safety, and environ-
mental risks" (25). Both provide exceptions
in certain cases including emergencies,
screening analyses, and some permitting
actions.
The agency actions to be affected are
authorized by many different federal
statutes. However, there is no more specific
identification of the actions to be affected,
or how they would be affected in the
record of hearings and committee reports
for the bills (13,26). The bills would over-
lay a variety ofnew requirements on a vari-
ety of established standards, without ana-
lyzing the effects ofthe changes.
Riskassessment. The bills prescribe what
is to be included in health risk assessments.
The House bill requires that assessments
include "relevant laboratory and relevant
epidemiological data of sufficient quality
which finds, or fails to find, a correlation
between health risks and apotential toxin or
activity." In cases where conflicts between
data "appear to exist" or "where animal data
is used as a basis to assess human health,"
the bill would require that the assessment
"include discussion of possible reconcilia-
tion ofconflicting information, and as rele-
vant, differences in study design, compara-
tive physiology, routes ofexposure, bioavail-
ability, pharmacokinetics, and any other rel-
evant factor, including the sufficiency of
basic data for review" (22). In cases where
assumptions or models are used, the docu-
ments are to "present a representative list
and explanations ofplausible and alternative
inferences or models; explain the basis for
any choices; [and] identify any policy or
valuejudgments.. ." (28).
These provisions raise several questions,
none easily answered at this point. One is
whether the extensive information to be
compiled will be informative for all the
agency actions for which it will be
required. The information required is most
pertinent to assessments ofsingle agents for
carcinogenic effects. However, the actions
that will be covered will include assess-
ments of many kinds of health and envi-
ronmental issues, at varying scales. Some
will require consideration of multiple
agents and multiple effects, which, while
based in part on animal data, may not lend
themselves to this type and level ofanalysis.
In other cases, altogether different
approaches may be more useful. For exam-
ple, in testimony before the House of
Representatives, Tara O'Toole, Assistant
Secretary of the Department of Energy,
described significant actions for which the
required data will be of little value. One
example was an assessment ofhealth, safe-
ty, and management issues associated with
spent nuclear fuels including plutonium,
for which methods previously developed
were more appropriate (29).
Second, the applicability ofthe require-
ments for risk assessment to noncancer
health effects needs to be examined. The
regulatory approach to contaminants that
may pose noncancer health effects is differ-
ent from that for carcinogens. For contam-
inants that cause noncancer health effects,
animal testing is used to identify a dose for
which no adverse effects are reported,
called a no-observed-adverse-effect level
(NOAEL). The NOAEL is adjusted for
humans by use of uncertainty and safety
factors, resulting in an estimate of a dose
assumed to be safe, often called a reference
dose. This approach is based on an
assumption that there is a threshold for
exposure to contaminants causing non-
cancer effects. While the House bill's pro-
visions apply to all cases where animal data
are used, it does not appear to have con-
templated this practice.
A third issue is the effect ofthe legisla-
tion on use of default values or models in
cases ofuncertainty. The bill would appear
to prohibit use ofagreed-upon default val-
ues and require that issues of model selec-
tion, as well as use ofother default values,
be decided de novo in every action. Ifso, it
would impose a vastly increased analytic
burden and inhibit action in cases where
uncertainty does not allow a definitive res-
olution of conflicting approaches. This
appears to be contrary to a recent NAS rec-
ommendation, which endorsed use of
default options as a workable approach in
cases of uncertainty. The NAS recom-
mended that (13):
EPAshould continue to regard the use of
default options as a reasonable way to
deal with uncertainty about underlying
mechanisms in selecting methods and
models for use in risk assessment.
The NAS noted that the basis for each
default option should be defined and crite-
ria for adequate scientific evidence to
depart from a default option should be
adopted (13).
A central question is whether it makes
sense to adopt into statute specific provi-
sions for conducting risk assessments, as
methods are evolving and still highly con-
troversial. New methods for risk assessment
will continue to be developed. Some ques-
tions may be resolved. For example, EPA is
reportedly considering revising guidelines
to provide for the consideration ofmecha-
nisms of action in risk assessment (30).
Freezing the process is unlikely to be the
best approach.
Characterization ofrisk. The legisla-
tion prescribes how risks are to character-
ized after they are assessed. The House bill
says that numeric risk characterizations
shall provide "the best estimate or estimates
for the specific populations or natural
resources which are the subject ofthe char-
acterization ... and a statement ofthe rea-
sonable range of scientific uncertainties"
(31). The "best estimate" is defined in HR
9 as (32):
a scientifically appropriate estimate
which is based, to the extent feasible, on
one ofthefollowing:
(A) Central estimates of the risk using
the most plausible assumptions.
(B) An approachwhich combines multiple
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estimates based on different scenarios and
weighs the probabilityofeach scenario.
(C) Any other methodology designed to
provide the most unbiased representation
of the most plausible level of risk, given
the current scientific information avail-
able to the Federal agency concerned.
The Senate language is similar
(33).Other estimates may also be provided.
The best estimate as defined above is
emphasized. A purpose of this language
appears to be to require a departure from
existing practice of using default methods
to estimate unit risk for carcinogens.
Currently, when animal data are used, high
doses given to animals must be extrapolat-
ed to a lower dose range typical ofenviron-
mental exposures. A linear nonthreshold
model may be used to estimate the potency
of the carcinogen. The upper confidence
interval is often used, for several reasons.
One is that it yields a more stable estimate,
less subject to perturbation from small
changes in experimental results, than a
maximum likelihood estimate. A second
reason is that it is linear at the low-dose
range (34).
The language applies to other elements
of a risk assessment process and would
seem to preclude use of conservative esti-
mates at any point. This would be impor-
tant because the actual risk (or parameter
value) should not exceed an upper-bound
estimate ofrisk (or a parameter) more than
5% of the time. If a central tendency esti-
mate is used, the actual value would be
expected to exceed the estimate 50% ofthe
time. This distinction is important because,
while the bill also allows reporting of
upper-bound and lower-bound estimates,
the "best" estimate is given a particular sig-
nificance as the preferred way to character-
ize risk. Given inherent biological variabili-
ty, as well as uncertainty, mandating this
approach in all cases is troubling.
The legislation would also allow best
estimates to be based on modeling ofprob-
ability distributions of input parameters.
Such methods could be valuable where
adequate data for input parameters are
available. However, they are demanding of
computing resources and data and often
not feasible to use.
Issues for risk assessment are complex.
There is no agreed-upon definition ofwhat
a best estimate will be in every case, even if
this were an appropriate approach. If the
legislation requires revisiting every issue for
every assessment, more resources will go
into risk assessment and fewer resources
will go into public health. Under such an
approach, lack ofdata will preclude action
to an even greater extent than it does now.
Economic analysis. The economic pro-
visions ofthe legislation are not considered
in detail here, but should be noted. Both
the House and Senate bills require that
alternative means ofachieving an objective
be considered, including market-based
methods such as tradable permit systems.
These alternatives are to be evaluated for
their cost-effectiveness (35,36). Cost-bene-
fit analysis is to be performed for major
rules. What may be considered in a
cost-benefit analysis and how nonmone-
tary costs and benefits may be considered
vary between the bills.
New Decision Criteria
The bills would change how agencies make
decisions. The bills require use ofnew deci-
sion criteria for agency actions under exist-
ing statutes, such as the Clean Water Act
or the Occupational Safety and HealthAct.
The criteria are different from those ofthe
existing statutes. How such conflicts would
be resolved is unclear. HR 9 says that its
criteria "supersede the decision criteria for
rulemaking otherwise applicable under the
statute to which the rule is promulgated"
(21). However, HR 9 also says that " . . .
nothing in this title shall be construed to
modify any statutory standard or statutory
requirement designed to protect health,
safety, or the environment" (32). Whether
the new criteria would override or merely
supplement existing statutes is a matter of
significant debate (38). This is a critical,
unresolved issue with the legislation.
With regard to risk assessment, the
decision criteria appear to give a special sta-
tus to the risk analysis and characterization
required in the bill. In HR 9, before taking
an action, an agency must certify that all of
the required analyses have been completed,
including the required comparison ofcosts
and benefits. The analyses must be "based
on objective and unbiased scientific and
economic evaluations ofall significant and
relevant information . . ." (39). This sug-
gests that the risk characterization required
in the bill be used as the basis of the pro-
posal for the cost-benefit analysis that
must be completed and thereby serve as the
basis for agency action. Because a central
tendency estimate will underpredict actual
risk 50% ofthe time, this would appear to
make it difficult to use values that are pro-
tective of a population, given population
variability.
For economic issues, decision criteria
included in the bills generally do three
things: 1) require that the most cost-effec-
tive ofthe alternatives analyzed be selected;
2) create a preference for "market-oriented"
approaches over centralized regulations and
performance standards over prescriptive
standards; 3) require that the proposals
pass a cost-benefit test. The House bill
requires that "the incremental risk reduc-
tion or other benefits of any strategy cho-
sen will be likely to justify, and be reason-
ably related to, the incremental costs" (40).
The Senate bill says that a final rule may
not be promulgated unless (41)
(1) the potential benefits from the rule
justify the potential costs ofthe rule; and
(2) the rule will produce the most cost-
effective result of any of the reasonable
alternatives that the agency has the dis-
cretion to adopt ...
The values and limitations ofcost-ben-
efit analysis have been discussed and debat-
ed in the policy literature (42). It is fair to
say that most proponents ofthe method do
not advocate its use as a litmus test for
whether to proceed with an intervention,
but rather as a technique that contributes
valuable information to the decision-mak-
ing processes. As economist Paul Portney
testified during Senate hearings (43):
[R]eform legislation should avoid the
perils of excessive quantification. It is
useful-nay, essential-to make our reg-
ulators think hard and analytically about
the good their programs will do and the
burdens they will impose. Where these
benefits and costs can reasonably be
identified and expressed in dollar terms,
they should be accompanied by sensitivi-
ty analysis to reflect uncertainties. But it
makes no sense to me to pretend that we
can, at this point in time, at least, make
predictions of ecosystem damage analo-
gous to the estimates we can make of
expected reductions in cancer cases that
might accompany reduced ambient con-
centrations of a carcinogenic air pollu-
tant. While we should push regulators to
be quantitative and precise where they
can, they need also to be able to say,
"This program will have other good (or
bad) effects. While I cannot estimate
their likelihood or magnitude at this
time, they played.a role in the decision I
made.
The necessity of quantifying costs and
benefits in comparable terms means that
they must be converted to monetary values.
The relative difficulty ofquantifying health
benefits as compared to quantifying risk
reduction costs is a concern when a cost-
benefit test is mandatory. Methods for
quantifying the value of a human life are
more controversial than methods for quan-
tifying costs, such as compliance costs, that
are inherently expressed in dollars. The
quantification of noncancer chronic health
effects is another important issue. As noted
above, current methods for assessing non-
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cancer health effects do not lead to a risk
estimate but are expressed qualitatively,
making it more difficult for them to be
incorporated into a cost-benefit assessment.
Cost-benefit analysis also fails to address
distribution of either costs or benefits, an
important consideration for public health.
It is also interesting to note that the bill
includes no provision for reporting uncer-
tainty in estimates ofcosts and benefits.
Judicial andAdministrative Review
The bills allow for judicial review and for
both existing regulations and new propos-
als for agency action. In the House bill, all
of the required analyses are available for
judicial review when appealed by an affect-
ed party. Specifically, "the court shall con-
sider the agency action unlawful ifthe cri-
teria are not met" (44). The court may
decide whether the standards for risk
assessment, risk characterization, and cost-
benefit analysis, as well as the decision cri-
teria, have been met. This could mean that
every aspect of a risk assessment or
cost-benefit analysis, including aspects that
necessarily require the exercise ofjudgment
in the face of uncertainty, would be
resolved by the courts. Issues that are quite
appropriate for debate in a collegial setting
would be subject to review and decision by
the courts. The Senate bill differs from the
House in that it does not allow review of
analyses except as part ofthe record for the
decisions the analyses support (45).
S 343 would establish rights for review
ofall existing regulations upon petition of
a concerned party (46). All existing regula-
tions would be retroactively available for
appeal, based on new standards defined in
the statute. The potential for paralysis of
federal health and environmental agencies
is considerable. Even management tools
such as EPA's Integrated Risk Information
System, used to adopt toxicity values,
would be subject to reevaluation.
Priority Setting
The bills have provisions for a larger priori-
ty-setting process, in addition to the exten-
sive review of individual agency proposals
for action. HR 9 directs the president to
"identify opportunities to reflect priorities
within existing Federal regulatory pro-
grams" (47). The Senate bill directs the
Office ofManagement and Budget (OMB)
and the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) to commission a study of
methods for comparative risk assessment
and completion of a comparative risk
assessment, for all programs of the federal
government. The study is to be completed
within 3 years, is to be subject to peer
review, and is to report results "in a man-
ner that distinguishes between the scientific
conclusions and any policy or value judg-
ments embodied in the comparisons" (48).
Moreover, individual agencies are directed
to prioritize use ofresources.
Methods to identify the relative signifi-
cance ofdifferent environmental problems
through comparative risk assessment have
been developing for several years (11).
Comparative risk assessment was begun as
an attempt by EPA in the 1980s to make
sense of multiple, conflicting priorities set
through various statutes and court decisions
(10). EPA produced an assessment of the
relative risks posed by a list ofenvironmen-
tal problems and noted that the results ofits
review differed from results obtained by
polling the public for environmental protec-
tion priorities (4p). EPA subsequently asked
its Science Advisory Board (SAB) to com-
ment on how comparative risk assessment
should be done. The SAB produced a series
of recommendations on how the process
could be improved and better informed by
available scientific data (50). Since then,
EPA has sponsored and cooperated in com-
parative risk projects at the state and local
level throughout the country to review the
available data and identify priorities for
action. Typically these projects have consid-
ered risks to health, ecological systems, and
social welfare. The state and local projects
have typically produced priorities and action
plans based on a combination of technical
inputs, including assessments of risk, and
other considerations such as public com-
ment and judgments on the part of those
ultimatelyresponsible for the projects (51).
Distinctions between scientific findings
and other policy inputs have not been an
important result. Based on this experience,
comparative risk assessment is viewed by its
sponsors and major practitioners as neces-
sarily combining elements derived from
quantitative risk assessment methods and
thoughtful judgments by individuals
reflecting a variety ofperspectives informed
by contributions ofthe public. This experi-
ence suggests that societal values are also
important and should be considered in
environmental decision-making.
The value of ranking risks is often
cited, but it is important to acknowledge
the differences that arise in doing this at
different scales and to acknowledge the dif-
ficulty of performing credible assessments
on alarge scale. The debate over risk assess-
ment has focused attention on the limits of
our ability to accurately assess risk of even
relatively well-described exposures to single
substances. The issues associated with rank-
ing risk at a national scale are orders of
magnitude more difficult. Such exercises
are far from being as well described as
quantitative risk assessment and necessarily
involve common-sense approaches to
grouping and comparing problems.
Priority-setting is more than a technical
process; it is a policy process as well, and in
some sense belongs in the risk management
side of the risk assessment-risk manage-
ment continuum. As the Carnegie
Commission on Science and Technology
wrote in its recommendations (14):
Agencies should place problems in broad
risk categories and develop strategies to
address risks ofhigh priority. To do this,
each regulatory agency addressing envi-
ronmental and risk-related issues should
develop a broad-based risk inventory.
The agencies should use the inventories'
output to help develop multidimensional
risk rankings. The agencies should exper-
iment with methods to integrate societal
values into relative risk analyses where
statutes do not supply all the value judg-
ments necessary to rank risks.
The limited ability of more risk assess-
ment to resolve uncertainty is a major con-
cern. The case ofthe dioxin reassessment is
instructive in this regard. This topic has
been covered previously in EHP (52). The
health risks ofdioxin have been exhaustive-
ly examined by EPA in a process costing
upwards of$2 million, resulting in a docu-
ment of more than 2000 pages, recently
reviewed by the SAB. Despite this level of
effort, the debate over level ofrisk has not
been fully resolved. Continued analysis has
the effect ofpostponing any action. In the
meantime, dioxins, which are persistent
compounds, continue to be released into
the environment.
Lash identified four factors to be con-
sidered in setting priorities: risk, feasibility
of an effective response, cost, and public
preferences (53). This is a useful formula-
tion. If we are to pursue reform that pro-
motes public health and the environment,
the primary goal is not to assess and char-
acterize risks, but to reduce risks.
Ultimately, efforts should focus on finding
opportunities for the greatest risk reduc-
tion. This requires not only an accurate
assessment ofrisk but also an assessment of
the feasibility of risk reduction. Focusing
all attention on the "worst" problems does
not make sense in cases where the worst
problems are intractable while others are
more easily or economically resolved, per-
haps to the same net benefit. This is a fun-
damental limitation ofusing risk alone as a
way ofidentifying problems for resolution.
The process should assess opportunities for
effective intervention.
To develop an approach, the deficien-
cies of current policy should be assessed
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and addressed comprehensively, not selec-
tively. The reform debate focuses on how
to change assessment as ifthe list ofpoten-
tial hazards being addressed is complete
and the only problem is conservatism. Yet
this is not the case. The relatively short list
of known carcinogens is regulated only in
some environmental media, in some pro-
grams (34). Very few ofthe 65,000 chemi-
cals in EPA's inventory have been tested for
cancer effects, and far fewer have been test-
ed for other effects. Approaches are avail-
able to speed the assessment of chemicals
(54). A credible reform approach needs to
address these issues.
Such an approach requires a broad
rather than a narrow view. Rather than
overlaying new requirements for analyses
over an already complex, and flawed, sys-
tem, a focus on priority-setting requires a
process that considers all of the potential
problems and forecasts the future to the
extent possible. The needs and goals ofsci-
entists and health professionals as well as
the public and the regulated industries
should be included in such a process The
public health community needs to face up
to the importance of working with the
community and incorporating public val-
ues into its priority-setting. To fail to do
this will substantially limit our effective-
ness. We need to free both management
agencies and our thinking from narrow
media- and problem-specific constraints
and create incentives for pollution preven-
tion and toxic use reduction. This will
require new structure, new roles, and
visionaryleadership.
Conclusion
Risk assessment is a valuable but limited
tool. We should not expect that increasing
use of improved risk assessment methods
will resolve uncertainties and preclude the
need for the exercise ofjudgment. A solu-
tion to this dilemma will require a different
approach.
We need to recognize what science and
risk assessment can contribute to regulatory
policy. We must also recognize what they
cannot contribute. We need to use credible
scientific data and conclusions, but we also
need to recognize that uncertainty will per-
sist. Epidemiological studies, properlyrecog-
nized in the legislative proposals as provid-
ing the best basis for risk characterization,
have limits, especially in cases oflow-level
environmental exposures (55). Both scientif-
ic judgment and policy judgment are need-
ed to address the important issues of the
day. Inscience,judgment is needed toweigh
evidence and achieve an understanding of
what can be gleaned from often incomplete,
contradictory, and conflicting data.
In scientific work, our highest goal is
to reach valid condusions about the truth.
We want to avoid reaching incorrect con-
clusions, and we employ our scientific
methods accordingly. But there is a tension
between avoiding incorrect conclusions
about the presence of an effect and the
absence ofan effect. From an environmen-
tal and public health perspective, the fail-
ure to identify a significant health risk is of
considerable importance. Both overprotec-
tion and underprotection have conse-
quences, though the consequences differ
for different groups. When we take too
strong an action (false positives), parties
incur inappropriate and excessive costs
with no real benefit. When we take a weak
action or no action (false negatives) the
public pays the costs of increased health
risks (56). Both are to be avoided. Absence
of evidence is neither evidence of the lack
ofan effect nor grounds for presuming that
a hazard exists.
In public policy, and especially public
health, our highest goal is to make reason-
able decisions to protect the health of the
public from unacceptable risks. We must
also recognize the limits ofscience and the
differences between sound science and
sound policy. This process will be greatly
enhanced by comparative risk methods that
integrate societal values into relative risk
estimates. Unfortunately, while intended to
address overreaction to environmental
threats, this legislation does little to advance
the public interest but could, in fact, tip the
scales awayfrom thepublic health.
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